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Hassin recently proposed the “Yes It Can” (YIC) principle to describe the division of labor
between conscious and unconscious processes in human cognition. According to this
principle, unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level cognitive
function that conscious processes can perform. In our commentary, we argue that the
author presents an overly idealized review of the literature in support of the YIC principle.
Furthermore, we point out that the dissimilar trends observed in social and cognitive
psychology, with respect to published evidence of strong unconscious effects, can better
be explained by the way how awareness is defined and measured in both research fields.
Finally, we show that the experimental paradigm chosen by Hassin to rule out remaining
objections against the YIC principle is unsuited to verify the new default notion that all
high-level cognitive functions can unfold unconsciously.
Keywords: consciousness, social psychology, cognitive psychology, visual perception, continuous flash
suppression
The “Yes It Can” Principle
In Perspectives on Psychological Science, Hassin has recently proposed a novel principle, the “Yes It
Can” (YIC) principle, to describe the division of labor between conscious and unconscious processes
in human cognition (Hassin, 2013). In brief, the YIC principle states that “unconscious processes can
carry out every fundamental high-level [cognitive] function that conscious processes can perform”
(p. 195). According to Hassin, two observations lend a priori plausibility to the YIC principle. First,
conscious processing has been shown to be severely capacity-limited (Baddeley, 2007). Second,
some theories suggest that conscious awareness as we experience it today might be a relatively
recent evolutionary development (Dennett, 1991). Hassin concludes that, therefore, “fundamental
cognitive functions are likely to occur outside of conscious awareness” (p. 195).
The author then reviews a wide and diverse range of supporting evidence from cognitive and
social psychology, as well as the cognitive neurosciences. The selected studies unanimously show
that high-level cognitive functions that were previously thought of as requiring consciousness can
indeed occur non-consciously, i.e., without awareness of the relevant stimuli or without awareness
of the influence of the relevant stimuli, respectively. In particular, he presents empirical data from
four different subsets of cognitive functions, namely cognitive control (e.g., conflict adaptation), goal
pursuit (e.g., goal priming), information broadcasting (e.g., semantic priming), and reasoning (e.g.,
decision making).
What is more, Hassin provides a surprisingly simple recipe for testing whether a cognitive
operation can be performed unconsciously. The operation should be stripped “into its basic-level
functions” and submitted to an experimental design which “(a) tests the functions while (b) allowing
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the processes to occur non-consciously” (p. 200). The YIC prin-
ciple predicts that based on this recipe any cognitive function
of interest will be found to be performed unconsciously. Hassin
concludes his paper by acknowledging that default notions are of
great importance for the advancement of science, and he expresses
his hope that the YIC principle will help establish a new default
mode of thinking about the abilities of the unconscious.
Hassin’s Idealized Review of the Literature
In support of the YIC principle, Hassin presents an idealized
review of the literature, without a single reference to conflict-
ing evidence, methodological debates or recent discussions of
the reproducibility of psychological studies. This selective focus
inevitably creates the impression that indeed the majority of
cognitive functions have already been proven to function uncon-
sciously. For example, onemajor line of research reviewed byHas-
sin suggests that complex decisions might benefit from a period
of time in which participants engage in what is referred to as
“unconscious thought” (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). What remains
unmentioned is that the theory’s main claims and decision task
have been met with severe methodological as well as theoretical
criticism (Gonzalez-Vallejo et al., 2008; Waroquier et al., 2009),
and that further empirical tests of the unconscious thought the-
ory’s predictions yielded no evidence in favor of these predictions
(Huizenga et al., 2012); for a recent meta-analysis and large-scale
replication attempt of the unconscious thought advantage, see
(Nieuwenstein et al., 2015).
In his review of the literature, Hassin also cites his own work
on priming which suggests that both invisible (Hassin et al.,
2007) and visible yet subtle (Carter et al., 2011) exposure to
national flags significantly changed political attitudes and voting
intentions up to 8 months later. Only after publication of the
YIC principle, a large-scale, preregistered “many labs” replica-
tion project did not replicate the finding that visible yet subtle
exposure to the American flag increased conservatism among
US participants (Klein et al., 2014). While replication should
become a standard tool in psychological science to confirm the
accuracy of empirical findings, clarify the conditions under which
an effect can be observed, and estimate the true effect size (Open
Science Collaboration, 2012; Simons, 2014), failures to replicate
often leave relevant questions unanswered, in particular questions
about the specificity of the underlying theories (Klein, 2014)1.
It is important to note that Hassin and colleagues supported the
replication attempt and acknowledged the failure to replicate the
flag priming effect, but also raised the issue of whether it was a
“conceptual” rather than “direct” replication, and they addressed
the importance of identifying potential moderators of the original
phenomenon and of understanding the theory behind the effects
(Ferguson et al., 2014).
1Wewould like to direct the reader’s attention toward two related special issues
which appeared in Perspectives on Psychological Science: the November 2012
issue dedicated to the topics of replicability and research practices, and the
January 2014 issue which features a special section focused on behavioral
priming research and attemps at replication. A further target article on the
replicability in psychology and open peer commentary can be found in a recent
edition of the European Journal of Personality (Asendorpf et al., 2013).
In sum, we believe that a nuanced review of the literature on
unconscious processing would not only be more adequate, but
also convey a more veridical picture telling us “definitely maybe”
rather than “yes it can,” as an answer to the question of whether
unconscious processes perform the same functions as conscious
processes.
Unconscious Priming in Social
and Cognitive Psychology
In a synthetic attempt, Hassin brings together two largely separate
research traditions in his overview of the literature, namely the
research on unconscious priming effects in social psychology,
on the one hand, and cognitive psychology, on the other. As
pointed out byHassin, the scope and limits of semantic subliminal
priming have been debated among cognitive psychologists over
the course of decades (Eriksen, 1960; Marcel, 1983; Greenwald,
1992; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007), with views shifting almost
pendulum-like across time, while research in the field of social
psychology, almost simultaneously, accumulated evidence for
unconscious priming effects following a monotonically upward
trend, in particular for behavioral priming effects. For example,
conceptual replications of the influential study showing that subtle
primes could affect overt behavior (Bargh et al., 1996) are abun-
dant. Amongst others, participants primed with the concept of
“politician” wrote essays that were considerably longer than did
control participants (Dijksterhuis and Van Knippenberg, 2000),
and the presence of a backpack in the experimental room primed
more cooperative behavior, while the presence of a briefcase
primed more competitive behavior (Kay et al., 2004).
In a recent opinion paper published in Perspectives on Psycho-
logical Science (as part of a special section described in footnote
1), Dijksterhuis estimated that there are between 200 and 400
empirical behavioral priming papers by now (Dijksterhuis, 2014).
To explain the dissimilar trends in social and cognitive psy-
chology, Hassin argues that “the unconscious is likely to engage
in motivationally relevant and interesting issues (such as goals,
stereotypes, and incentives) more than in motivationally irrel-
evant and less interesting issues (such as the relations between
chairs and tables)” (p. 201). As an alternative to this motivational
account, Doyen et al. (2014) have convincingly elaborated three
sources of conflict between the two research fields: awareness,
processes, and replicability.With respect to awareness, the authors
argue that in social psychology the absence of awareness is often
assumed rather than tested, and when tests are conducted, they
are below the standards widely used in cognitive psychology. Sim-
ilarly, it has been suggested that in social psychology experiments
on behavioral priming there has been a problematic shift from
defining unconscious as “without awareness of the stimuli” (as
in cognitive psychology) to “without awareness of the influence
of the stimuli” (Stafford, 2014). Thus, rather than a new default
mode of thinking about the abilities of the unconscious, the joint
efforts of social and cognitive psychology should help establish
a new default of measuring stimulus awareness in the diverse
range of priming experiments. This stringent default should entail
that for each experiment it first has to be defined which aspect
of awareness matters and how it can be measured optimally
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(Doyen et al., 2014). From a statistical perspective, much progress
has recently been made in the application of Bayesian statis-
tics to the central problem in consciousness research of stating
evidence for the null hypothesis, which is the case, for exam-
ple, when the aim is to establish chance-level performance as
a proof of objective unawareness of a stimulus (Dienes, 2015).
Therefore, any new default in consciousness research should also
involve well-informed thinking about statistical tests and their
implications.
Is Interocular Suppression Suited to Rule
out Remaining Objections?
As Hassin argues in the paragraph A Walk Through a Garden of
Objections, the YIC principle is often quickly criticized by devising
examples of cognitive functions that would, almost by definition,
require consciousness to fully unfold. Thus, a particularly strong
test of the YIC principle would be to acquire evidence for the
unconscious to be able to perform seemingly high-level cogni-
tive functions such as reading and effortful arithmetic. This was
exactly the goal of one experimental study which involved Hassin
as senior author (Sklar et al., 2012). To assess the feasibility of
unconscious reading and arithmetic, the authors used continuous
flash suppression (CFS) to unconsciously present multiple-word
verbal expressions or single-digit equations to observers. CFS
refers to an interocular suppression technique in which discrepant
images are presented to the different eyes at corresponding retinal
locations (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; Yang and Blake, 2012). In
consciousness research, there has always been a trade-off between
different paradigms to present stimuli unconsciously to observers
(Kim and Blake, 2005; Bachmann et al., 2007). For example, visual
masking provides a reliable tool to present a stimulus in the
absence of awareness, yet it suffers from a very short presentation
time of this stimulus. Binocular rivalry provides a longer window
to present stimuli unconsciously, but it is much harder to control
how long a stimulus will be suppressed. In contrast, CFS provides
the potential to present visual stimuli unconsciously from trial
onset and for extended periods (i.e., on a second rather than
millisecond timescale). This has rendered CFS an increasingly
attractive technique to study the limits of unconscious process-
ing2. As Sklar et al. (2012) argue, CFS is a “cutting edge mask-
ing technique” that probably will act as a “game changer” (p.
19614) in consciousness research due to its seemingly unlimited
potential to present stimuli unconsciously for extended periods
of time.
In their study, Sklar et al. (2012) use CFS in two different
ways to study unconscious reading and arithmetic. With respect
to reading, the semantic coherence and the affective value of
multiple-word verbal expressions was manipulated, and the time
it took for these expressions to break suppression was measured
(hence “b-CFS” paradigm). The reasoning behind b-CFS is that
differential suppression times for differential stimuli must be due
to differences in processing during suppression if control mea-
sures can convincingly show that the stimuli show no intrinsic
2For a complete CFS reference list, see http://www.gestaltrevision.be/en/
resources/reference-guides/83-resources/reference-guides/343
difference in detectability when no interocular suppression is
involved. In these b-CFS experiments, Sklar et al. (2012) showed
that semantically incoherent expressions broke suppression faster
than semantically coherent ones and that the affective value of ver-
bal expressions modulated suppression time such that increasing
negativity of the expression lowered suppression times signifi-
cantly. With respect to arithmetic, Sklar et al. (2012) presented
single-digit equations with three terms but without result (e.g.,
“9–3–4=”) and tested whether these would influence the enumer-
ation of a visible target number. Here, a significant congruency
effect was observed for subtraction primes, but not for addition
primes. For addition primes, the authors observed congruency
effects only when single-digit equations with two terms were
unconsciously presented and participants had to report whether a
subsequently presented visible addition equation with two terms
and result was correct or not. Based on their results, the authors
concluded that themeaning of verbal expressions can be extracted
unconsciously and that effortful arithmetic equations can be
solved without awareness.
The study by Sklar et al. (2012) is not the only one that has used
CFS and concluded that unconscious high-level (visual) process-
ing is possible. Indeed, to name a few, studies have shown that
word meaning (Costello et al., 2009) and word valence (Yang and
Yeh, 2011) can be processed unconsciously, that scene congruency
information can be extracted in the absence of visual awareness
(Mudrik et al., 2011), that emotional information is processed
during suppression (Yang et al., 2007) or that sexual orientation
can bias the processing of unconsciously presented nude pictures
(Jiang et al., 2006).
We would like to argue, however, that this enthusiasm for the
potential of CFS to explore uncharted territories for consciousness
research is most likely premature and farfetched. The principal
reason for this argument is that all studies that embark on finding
high-level unconscious processing during CFS ignore the repre-
sentation of the stimulus while it is being suppressed. That is, any
paradigm that renders a visual stimulus does so by interfering
with the processing of the unconsciously presented stimulus in
some way (Fogelson et al., 2014). If not, the stimulus would
always be visible to the observer. CFS is closely related to binocu-
lar rivalry, a well-known interocular suppression technique, the
mechanisms of which have been extensively investigated in the
last decades (Blake and Logothetis, 2002; Sterzer, 2013). Given the
rather limited cognitive processing during binocular suppression
(Zimba and Blake, 1983; Blake, 1988; Cave et al., 1998; Kang
et al., 2011), the default stance should thus be not to expect
much high-level unconscious processing during CFS (Breitmeyer,
2014). Recent neuroimaging data suggests that the presence of
CFSmasks dramatically reduces neural activity related to the sup-
pressed stimulus already in early visual cortex (Yuval-Greenberg
and Heeger, 2013). Thus, the representation of the suppressed
stimulus is expected to be rather limited to a loose collection of
elemental features that are presumably coded in these early visual
areas, despite the fact that the stimulus is presented unbeknownst
to the observer for extended periods of time (Gayet et al., 2014).
Indeed, considering the CFS literature as a whole sketches a
more complicated and fuzzy picture about the extent to which
high-level unconscious visual processing is possible under CFS
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(Heyman and Moors, 2014; Sterzer et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2014;
Ludwig and Hesselmann, 2015). The interested reader is fur-
ther referred to Dubois and Faivre (2014) for a special issue in
Frontiers in Psychology (Consciousness Research) on the depth of
unconscious processing as inferred from different suppression
techniques. Similar to the picture sketched based on the behavioral
priming literature, the picture emerging from the accumulating
literature on unconscious processing during CFS is rather “defi-
nitely maybe” than “yes it can.”
Concluding Remarks
In our commentary, we have presented arguments against the YIC
principle which states that unconscious processes can carry out
every fundamental high-level cognitive function that conscious
processes can perform. We argued that the apparent strength of
the YIC principle is based on an idealized review of the available
literature and that it ignores the ongoing and lively methodolog-
ical discussions on how to appropriately study unconscious pro-
cessing. Furthermore, the proposed potential of a paradigm such
asCFS to rule out any remaining objections regardingYIC appears
to be overvalued and based on a similarly idealized reading of the
literature. While we agree with Hassin that progress in science
requires new ideas and defaults, we would argue that rather than
“yes it can” a more skeptical “definitely maybe” is in much better
accordance with the current state of affairs.
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